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 SAME-SEX DIVORCE AND WISCONSIN COURTS: 
IMPERFECT HARMONY? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that same-sex marriage is one of the most controversial 
issues facing both the public and private sectors.
1
  In recent years state 
governments have come down on both sides of the issue, either creating 
statutes and common-law precedents that allow various forms of legal 
recognition for same-sex relationships
2
 or creating statutes and constitutional 
amendments to ban legal unions between homosexuals.
3
  One of the issues 
 
1. See, e.g., Sylvia Honig, Letter to the Editor, Same-Sex Couples Are Making Reasonable, 
Decent Marriage Request, TIMES UNION (Albany), June 30, 2007, at A8 (describing the controversy 
regarding same-sex marriage and the difficulties of finding a solution). 
2. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-
38aa–pp (West Supp. 2008); D.C. CODE § 32-701(3)–(4) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-
1–7 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1–8 (Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 37:1-
28–36 (West Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (2002); Act of July 30, 2004, ch. 672, 
2004 Me. Laws 2126, 2126–31; S.B. 566, 425th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008); S.B. 597, 425th 
Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008); H.B. 2007, 74th Leg., 2007 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); Act of April 
20, 2007, ch. 155, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 616, 616–19; Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); C.M. v. 
C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).  Additionally, although Rhode Island does not 
currently have any laws denying or allowing legal recognition of same-sex relationships, the Rhode 
Island attorney general has issued an opinion that ―Rhode Island will recognize same sex marriages 
lawfully performed in Massachusetts as marriages in Rhode Island.‖  Letter from Patrick C. Lynch, 
R.I. Att‘y Gen., to Jack R. Warner, Comm‘r, R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ. 6 (Feb. 20, 
2007), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/ri-ag-statement.pdf; see also Letter from 
Stuart Rabner, N.J. Att‘y Gen., to Joseph Komosinski, State Registrar of Vital Statistics 1 (Feb. 16, 
2007), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases07/ag-formal-opinion-2.16.07.pdf (stating 
that ―government-sanctioned, same-sex relationships validly established under the laws of other 
States . . . will be valid in New Jersey . . . either as civil unions or domestic partnerships‖).  These 
letters were issued in response to a Massachusetts superior court judge‘s ruling that ―same-sex 
marriage is not prohibited in Rhode Island.‖  See Cote-Whiteacre v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, No. 04-
2656, 2006 WL 3208758, at *4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 2006). 
3. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; 
ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIII, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA. 
CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, ¶ 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (giving the Hawaii 
legislature the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples, which it did in HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 572-1 (LexisNexis 2005)); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; KY. 
CONST. § 233a; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. XIV, 
§ 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, invalidated 
by Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005); NEV. CONST. 
art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. 
CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, 
§ 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. 
XIII, § 13; WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2) (2007–2008); WIS. STAT. § 765.04(1) (2007–2008).  
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hiding behind this hot-button topic, however, is how same-sex couples, 
specifically those who have achieved legal recognition of their relationships, 
legally dissolve their unions. 
As all too many couples know,
4
 such dissolutions entail numerous court 
dates, filings, and expenses, and they often involve quarreling and hostility 
between the parties.  Now that same-sex couples are quickly achieving greater 
recognition of their relationships, they must also deal with these struggles to 
end them.  The purpose of this Comment is to examine how legally 
recognized same-sex couples would, or should be able to, obtain legal 
dissolution in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage, particularly in 
Wisconsin. 
Following the Introduction, Part II of this Comment examines examples 
of the various federal and state frameworks for same-sex marriage and 
divorce, to provide a frame of reference in examining how Wisconsin courts 
should treat same-sex divorce.  To that same end, this Comment looks at 
recent state-court decisions in Rhode Island
5
 and New York,
6
 each of which 
deals with a same-sex couple‘s attempt to legally dissolve their relationship.  
After a brief history of the same-sex marriage debate in Wisconsin, including 
the recent prohibitory constitutional amendment,
7
 Part III of this Comment 
will present a detailed explanation of three possible methods of handling 
same-sex divorce in Wisconsin. 
These three possible solutions are based on various policy and legal 
considerations and consist of the following: 1) barring access to the 
Wisconsin courts entirely for dissolution proceedings; 2) allowing the same-
sex partners into court and applying Wisconsin law to adjudicate the divorce; 
or 3) allowing the same-sex partners into court and applying the laws of the 
state where the relationship was founded.  Each presents its own difficulties 
and justifications, all of which will be explored in detail in Part III. 
 
Interestingly, Virginia‘s constitutional amendment is the only one that not only bars same-sex 
marriage, but also excludes recognition of civil unions and private partnership contracts between 
same-sex partners.  For a full list of states with anti-same-sex marriage constitutional amendments 
and statutes, see NAT‘L CONF. OF STATE LEGS., SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND 
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (last visited Jan. 
6, 2009) [hereinafter SAME SEX MARRIAGE]. 
4. See WIS. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., DIV. OF PUB. HEALTH, BUREAU OF HEALTH 
INFO. & POLICY, WISCONSIN MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES 2006, 12 (2007), available at 
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/stats/pdf/06mardiv.pdf (showing that in 2006, the total number of divorces 
was 16,730, or 50% of the total number of marriages in the same year). 
5. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). 
6. C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
7. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. 
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II. FEDERAL AND STATE FRAMEWORKS 
To understand the nature of the same-sex divorce question and its 
surrounding issues, it is helpful to first survey examples of federal and non-
Wisconsin state frameworks for handling this issue.  The primary federal law 
on point is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which was signed into law 
by President Bill Clinton.
8
  At the state level, thirteen states, along with the 
District of Columbia, have some form of legal recognition for same-sex 
relationships,
9
 and many also have developed legal methods for dissolving 
these relationships.
10
 
Because DOMA preceded many of these states‘ efforts, section A of this 
Part examines DOMA in depth, discussing its history, purpose, and 
implications for Wisconsin in dealing with the issue of same-sex divorce.  
Section B then examines the evolution of same-sex marriage and divorce in 
Massachusetts, followed by an analysis of three recent cases dealing with 
same-sex divorce, one from Rhode Island
11
 and two from New York.
12
  These 
 
8. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, §§ 2–3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).  DOMA is a two-part statute.  The 
Title 28 portion reads: 
 
§ 1738C.  Certain acts, records, and proceedings and the effect thereof 
 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall 
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws 
of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising 
from such relationship. 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (emphasis added). 
 The Title 1 portion reads: 
 
§ 7.  Definition of ―marriage‖ and ―spouse‖ 
 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word ―marriage‖ means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
―spouse‖ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife. 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added). 
9. See sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
10. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 4 (West 2007) (detailing divorce procedures for 
both heterosexual and homosexual married couples); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1206 (2002) (―The 
dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedure and be subject to the same substantive 
rights and obligations that are involved with the dissolution of marriage . . . .‖). 
11. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). 
12. C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 
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three non-Wisconsin examples all will shed light on Wisconsin‘s options for 
handling same-sex divorce when the need to do so arises. 
A.  The Defense of Marriage Act 
1. Historical Background 
Congress passed DOMA, in part, in response to the Hawaii case Baehr v. 
Lewin.
13
  This case began in 1991, when three Hawaiian homosexual couples 
filed a civil lawsuit in state court challenging the Hawaii Department of 
Health‘s denial of their applications for marriage licenses.14  Specifically, the 
plaintiffs claimed that their equal protection rights under the Hawaii 
Constitution were being violated, in that they were being discriminated 
against on the basis of sex.
15
  The trial court granted judgment on the 
pleadings to the Department, but the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the plaintiffs were entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their equal 
protection claim.
16
  The court further held that sex qualified as a ―suspect 
category‖ under the Hawaii Constitution, and therefore, any law that 
discriminated on that basis would be subject ―to some form of heightened 
[judicial] scrutiny‖ when challenged on equal protection grounds.17 
The federal House Committee on the Judiciary responded directly to the 
Hawaii Supreme Court‘s Baehr decision in its report to the House of 
Representatives, where it stated in no uncertain terms that H.R. 3396, the bill 
proposing DOMA, was a ―response to a very particular development in the 
State of Hawaii,‖ specifically the fact that Hawaii ―appear[ed] to be on the 
verge of requiring that State to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.‖18  
In light of the Baehr case, and what the Committee on the Judiciary termed 
―[t]he legal assault against traditional heterosexual marriage laws,‖19 Congress 
passed DOMA on September 21, 1996.
20
 
2. DOMA‘s Dual Purposes 
The House Committee on the Judiciary set forth two primary purposes for 
DOMA: 1) ―to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage‖ and 
 
856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
13. 852 P.2d 44, 48–52 (Haw. 1993); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 4–6 (1996), reprinted 
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2908–10. 
14. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48–49. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 68. 
17. Id. at 65, 67 (internal quotations omitted). 
18. H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 2. 
19. Id. at 4. 
20. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2420 (1996). 
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2) ―to protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy 
regarding the legal recognition of same-sex unions, free from any federal 
constitutional implications that might attend the recognition by one State of 
the right for homosexual couples to acquire marriage licenses.‖21  Public Law 
104-199, DOMA‘s enacting legislation, further states that DOMA is ―[a]n Act 
to define and protect the institution of marriage.‖22  Essentially, DOMA was 
enacted to prevent one state‘s recognition of same-sex marriage from forcing 
recognition of such marriages on other states through the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the United States Constitution.
23
 
3. Implications for Wisconsin 
On the state level, the passage of DOMA represents a congressional 
delegation to the individual states of the decision whether to recognize out-of-
state, same-sex unions.  Thus, Congress presumably also has left the decision 
of how to deal with the dissolution of these out-of-state unions to the 
individual states.  This delegation of authority seems particularly likely 
because regulation of the family historically and presumptively has been 
reserved to state governments.
24
  Given this presumption and DOMA‘s 
historical background, it seems clear that there is no federal standard for 
handling the issue of same-sex divorce, meaning Wisconsin must look to its 
own laws, policies, and courts in deciding how to deal with this situation. 
This same-sex divorce policy decision is especially difficult (or perhaps 
especially easy
25
) for states such as Wisconsin that have prohibited same-sex 
 
21. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2. 
22. Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. at 2419. 
23. Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads: ―Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings 
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.‖  Congress apparently used the second sentence of this 
Section to justify enacting DOMA, stating in the House Report that this Section logically suggests 
that ―[w]hile full faith and credit is the rule—that is, while States are generally obligated to treat laws 
of other States as they would their own—Congress retains a discretionary power to carve out such 
exceptions as it deems appropriate.‖  H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 25–26 (footnote omitted).  When 
DOMA was initially passed, many critics wondered whether it could pass constitutional muster, i.e., 
whether Congress had the power it claimed to override the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  For an 
analysis of this question concluding that Congress does indeed have such power, see Lynn D. 
Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 365, 386–420 (2005).  But see Heather Hamilton, The Defense of Marriage Act: 
A Critical Analysis of Its Constitutionality Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause , 47 DEPAUL L.  
REV. 943, 973–87 (1998) (analyzing DOMA and concluding that Congress violated the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause). 
24. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001) (―There is indeed a presumption 
against [federal law] pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation such as family law.‖). 
25. Given the multitude of states that have enacted either statutes or constitutional amendments 
banning same-sex legal unions, see supra note 3, it is likely that many states would choose to 
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marriage by statute, constitutional amendment, or common-law decision.
26
  
These states already have taken a large step away from the legal recognition 
of same-sex couples, and the decision whether to open the courtroom doors to 
same-sex couples seeking divorce could either reinforce or undercut that 
position.  For example, if Wisconsin were to allow court access for same-sex 
divorces, in whatever form, people may construe this as an implied 
recognition of the legal existence of the relationship, contrary to the public 
policies embodied by Wisconsin‘s prohibitory statutes and constitutional 
amendment.
27
  By denying access for same-sex couples, however, Wisconsin 
courts would impose hardships on those individuals by forcing them to seek 
divorces in their state of union and would further alienate the State of 
Wisconsin from the homosexual community.
 28
 
Because of these concerns and potential consequences, Wisconsin courts 
must carefully consider their options in handling the same-sex divorce 
question.  To aid this consideration, it is helpful to examine how states that 
have chosen to recognize same-sex unions have dealt with the dissolution of 
such relationships, as this will reveal Wisconsin‘s options for handling same-
sex divorce, including an outright ban.  From these examples, perhaps 
Wisconsin courts can formulate a method for handling same-sex divorce that 
will serve the interests of all those involved.  To that end, the next section is 
 
effectively ignore the question by banning same-sex couples from the courtroom for divorce 
proceedings.  See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007) (finding that a same-
sex couple married in Massachusetts could not seek a divorce from the Rhode Island courts); see also 
discussion infra Part III.A (examining the justifications and effects of denying same-sex couples 
access to divorce proceedings). 
26. See supra note 3. 
27. See WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13; WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2) (2007–2008); WIS. STAT. 
§ 765.04(1) (2007–2008) (prohibiting, collectively, both same-sex marriage and civil unions). 
28. Forcing homosexual couples to return to their state of legal union is far from the only 
hardship imposed by denying these couples legal divorces.  These couples must also deal with 
various ancillary problems, many of which are a direct result of DOMA‘s limited defin ition of 
marriage.  Tax deductions for alimony payments, for example, are typically available for divorced 
spouses.  In the case of same-sex marriage, however, this federal right is denied.  Matt Carroll, The 
Gay Divorcees: First Came Gay Marriage.  Now Comes the Inevitable—and a Slew of 
Unprecedented Legal Questions, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2006, at E4, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2006/01/29/the_gay_divorcees; see also Anthony 
C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of 
Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407, 422–36 (2008) (discussing the various 
discriminatory impacts of the federal tax system on homosexual individuals and same-sex couples).   
 In addition to the loss of federal rights, same-sex couples may also face difficulties with 
seemingly basic aspects of divorce, such as relationship length.  Carroll, supra.  Because many courts 
use this as a factor when determining asset division, courts are forced to decide how long a same-sex 
couple has been married.  Id.  If the couple‘s legal marriage has existed only for a year because of 
state laws, however, the court may be forced to look beyond the legal relationship to determine its 
length, which may lead to messy balancing tests of highly subjective factors that heterosexual 
couples are not forced to endure.  Id. 
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devoted to discussion of same-sex unions and divorces in Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and New York, all of which have some form of legal 
recognition for same-sex relationships. 
B.  Same-Sex Marriage and Divorce Outside Wisconsin 
There are currently thirteen states, along with the District of Columbia, 
that recognize a range of rights for same-sex couples.
29
  These states are 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
30
 Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington.
 31
  Each state has varying forms of legal recognition for same-sex 
unions, starting with the lesser forms that grant ―some state-level spousal 
rights to unmarried couples,‖ moving all the way up to forms that allow legal 
marriages between same-sex partners.
32
  The next three sections focus on 
 
29. See sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
30. Interestingly, one Oregon county (Multnomah) actually authorized same-sex marriages for 
six weeks in early 2004 until a judge ―ordered the county to stop issuing marriage licenses to same 
sex-couples‖ pending the outcome of a lawsuit challenging the constitutiona lity of banning same-sex 
marriage.  Or. Dep‘t of Human Servs., Ctr. for Health Statistics, Current Status: Same-Sex Marriage, 
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/chs/order/samesex.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).  In that lawsuit, 
the Oregon Supreme Court ultimately held that Oregon statutory law ―limit[s] the right to obtain 
marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples‖ and that ―marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in 
Multnomah County . . . were issued without authority and were void at the time that they were 
issued.‖  Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005).  Thus, although Oregon has passed a domestic 
partnership law, see H.B. 2007, 74th Leg., 2007 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), it also has outlawed same-sex 
marriages, see OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a. 
31. Legislatures in four of these thirteen states, Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont, 
are currently considering legislation that would legalize same-sex marriage within the state.  Judy 
Harrison, Maine Gay Marriage Law Proposed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 2009, at 1; General 
Assemb. 2978, 2008 Leg., 213th Sess. (N.J. 2008); Jeremy W. Peters, For Supporters of Gay 
Marriage, a Dashing of Great Expectations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at A16; H.R. 178, 2009–2010 
Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009). 
32. SAME SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 3.  Until May 2008, Massachusetts was the only state to 
grant legal marriages to same-sex couples.  On May 16, 2008, however, the California Supreme 
Court held that ―in view of the substance and significance of the fundamental constitutional right to 
form a family relationship, the California Constitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee this 
basic civil right to all Californians, whether gay or heterosexual, and to same-sex couples as well as 
to opposite-sex couples.‖  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008).  The victory was 
short-lived, however, as California voters passed Proposition 8 in the November 2008 elections, 
which amended the California Constitution to read: ―Only marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in California.‖  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Howard Mintz, Another Wave of Legal 
Arguments Filed over California’s Proposition 8, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 6, 2009, at 2B.  
As of this Comment‘s printing, state government officials were vigorously challenging Propos ition 8, 
alleging that the voters lacked the authority to overturn the California Supreme Court‘s holding in 
Marriage Cases that the right to marry is a fundamental right.  Mintz, supra; Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d at 400.  California was not the only other state to follow Massachusetts‘s lead and recognize 
same-sex marriages: in October 2008 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that ―under the equal 
protection provisions of the [Connecticut] constitution, our statutory scheme governing marriage 
cannot stand insofar as it bars same sex couples from marrying.‖  Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. 
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states at the higher end of this spectrum, namely Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and New York. 
1. Massachusetts 
Anyone familiar with the same-sex marriage debate is aware of its origins 
in Massachusetts, where in 2003 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the 
Massachusetts Constitution‘s due process and equal protection provisions.33  
In 2004, the same court issued an advisory opinion to the Massachusetts 
Legislature regarding a potential bill to ban such licenses, and it stated again 
that such a ban would violate the state due process and equal protection 
clauses and would therefore be unconstitutional.
34
 
The landmark case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, which 
ultimately gave same-sex couples in Massachusetts the right to marry, was 
decided in November 2003.
35
  After several homosexual couples were denied 
marriage licenses by the Department, they sued the State on the grounds that 
the denial constituted a violation of several provisions of the Massachusetts 
Constitution.
36
  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sided with the 
homosexual couples and held: 
 
[T]he absence of any reasonable relationship between, on the 
one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples 
who wish to enter into civil marriage and, on the other, 
protection of public health, safety, or general welfare, 
suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent 
prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to 
be) homosexual.
37
 
 
A few months later, the Massachusetts Legislature sought the opinion of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as to the constitutionality of Senate 
Bill 2175, entitled ―An Act relative to civil unions.‖38  If enacted, this bill 
 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008).  As of this Comment‘s printing, this decision remains 
unchallenged.  Because Connecticut‘s recognition of same-sex marriage is so recent, however, there 
are no reported cases involving actions for same-sex divorce in the Connecticut courts, meaning it is 
more valuable to examine the laws of Massachusetts where there are established procedures for such 
actions.  See 2 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MONROE L. INKER, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE 
SERIES, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 26–27 (2007) (discussing same-sex divorce procedures). 
33. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
34. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). 
35. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941. 
36. Id. at 950. 
37. Id. at 968. 
38. Opinions, 802 N.E.2d at 566. 
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would have denied same-sex couples the right to marry, but would have 
granted them access to civil unions with all the ―‗benefits, protections, rights 
and responsibilities‘ of marriage.‖39  In its 2004 opinion to the Senate, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court echoed its Goodridge decision and 
stated that this bill, as written, would violate the Massachusetts Constitution‘s 
due process and equal protection provisions.
 40
  The court recommended that it 
not be enacted, and the legislature followed the court‘s advice.41  Thus, as a 
result of the Goodridge decision, same-sex couples were granted the right to 
marry in Massachusetts, and they applied for marriage licenses in droves.
42
 
Inevitably, the recognition of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts led to 
the advent of same-sex divorces within that state.  One news article postulated 
that of the estimated 10,000 homosexual couples that have taken advantage of 
the change in Massachusetts marriage law, dozens have attempted to dissolve 
their relationships through the court system.
43
  To achieve such dissolution, 
current Massachusetts law provides that homosexual couples, just like 
heterosexuals, must establish domicile within Massachusetts to grant the 
courts subject-matter jurisdiction over the divorce.
44
  In addition, new 
residents of Massachusetts are required to comply with a ―durational 
residency requirement,‖ under which they must live in Massachusetts for one 
year before applying for divorce.
45
 
 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 572. 
41. Id. 
42. Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage: The Overview; Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in 
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1.  Because the decision to grant same-sex marriages 
in the first place was made by the Massachusetts Supreme Court and not the legislature, it is not 
surprising that lawmakers attempted to have their say by working to place a constitutional 
amendment to ban gay marriage on the 2008 ballot.  Frank Phillips & Lisa Wangsness, Same-Sex 
Marriage Ban Advances, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 2007, at A1. This attempt was ultimately defeated, 
however, when the ban failed to receive enough votes in its second legislative hearing, thereby 
preventing its placement on the 2008 ballot.  Frank Phillips & Andrea Estes, Right of Gays to Marry 
Set for Years to Come, BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 2007, at A1. 
43. Dafna Linzer, Same-Sex Divorce Tests U.S. Legal System: Gay Couples Face 
Complications that Heterosexuals Don’t Encounter, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 6, 2008, at A10. 
44. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 4 (West 2007).  As one observer notes regarding 
achieving domicile in Massachusetts: 
 
The law governing domicile is well established and fact-intensive.  This means 
that to get a divorce [in Massachusetts] a same-sex spouse who is domiciled 
elsewhere will have to . . . make Massachusetts his or her permanent place of 
abode, i.e.[,] there will have to be sufficient indicia of domicile in the event it is 
challenged in the divorce or (more significantly) the issue of the validity of 
domicile and the divorce is challenged at some future date. 
KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32, § 26:19. 
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 208, § 5 (West 2007); see also KINDREGAN & INKER, supra 
note 32, § 27:4. 
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Provided the spouse seeking dissolution of the same-sex marriage 
complies with these statutory requirements, his or her petition for divorce will 
proceed similarly to that of heterosexual spouses.
46
  That is not to say, 
however, that same-sex couples encounter substantially the same difficulties 
as heterosexual couples.  Because DOMA defines marriage as only between a 
man and a woman,
47
 any federal rights that are typically granted to 
heterosexual couples upon divorce are denied to homosexual divorcees, as 
their marriage never existed under federal law.
48
  Rights to pensions, tax 
deductions for alimony payments, and medical coverage are only some of the 
federal rights that are thus denied to divorcing homosexual couples.
49
  As a 
result, despite the increase in rights given to same-sex couples under 
Massachusetts laws, there is little doubt that these rights still fall short of 
those given to heterosexual couples. 
Because of Massachusetts‘s recognition of same-sex marriage, 
homosexual couples flocked to that state to obtain marriage licenses, and 
subsequently returned to their home states with apparent validation in tow.
50
  
As some of these relationships broke down, however, the couples were forced 
to seek legal dissolution of the marriage.  As discussed earlier, a return to 
Massachusetts for such a proceeding entailed difficult domicile and durational 
residency requirements, prices that many couples were not willing to pay.
51
  
Thus, to achieve dissolution, couples began seeking legal divorces in the 
courts of their current domiciliary state.  Three examples of such couples are 
examined below. 
 
46. For a more in-depth examination of same-sex divorce law in Massachusetts, see 
KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32. 
47. For further discussion of DOMA, see supra Part II.A. 
48. See KINDREGAN, & INKER, supra note 32, § 26:19; Infanti, supra note 28; Linzer, supra 
note 43. 
49. See KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32, § 26:19; Linzer, supra note 43. 
50. See Belluck, supra note 42.  But see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 2007) 
(stating that ―[n]o marriage shall be contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and 
intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if contracted in 
such other jurisdiction‖).  Currently, under chapter 207, section 11, only couples from New Mexico, 
New York, and Rhode Island are allowed to obtain valid marriage licenses, as these are the only 
states where same-sex marriage is not clearly prohibited by law.  See Cote-Whiteacre v. Dep‘t of 
Pub. Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 WL 3208758, at *4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 2006) (finding that 
Rhode Island law does not prohibit same-sex marriage); David Abel, Same-Sex Couples From N.M. 
Allowed to Marry in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2007, at B3 (discussing the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Health‘s ruling that New Mexico does not explicitly ban gay marriage); C.M.  
v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887–88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding that same-sex marriages performed 
in Massachusetts are valid in New York, absent contrary legislative action). 
51. For a brief summary of these domicile and durational residency requirements, see 
KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32,  §§ 26:19, 27:4; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, 
§§ 4–5 (West 2007). 
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2. Rhode Island 
In May 2004, shortly after Massachusetts officially recognized same-sex 
marriages, Margaret R. Chambers and Cassandra B. Ormiston legally married 
in Fall River, Massachusetts.
52
  In October 2006, the couple sought to dissolve 
their marriage, and Ms. Chambers accordingly filed a petition for divorce in 
Rhode Island Family Court.
53
  On December 11, 2006, the family court 
certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court ―a question as to whether or not 
the family court [had] subject matter jurisdiction to grant a petition for divorce 
with respect to a same-sex couple.‖54 
In a 3-2 decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the family 
court lacked jurisdiction to grant such a petition.
55
  The court based its 
decision in part on a dictionary definition of marriage from 1961, the year the 
act creating the Rhode Island Family Court became law.
56
  Based on this 
definition, the court concluded ―there [was] absolutely no reason to believe 
that, when the act creating the family court became law in 1961, the 
legislators understood the word marriage to refer to any state other than ‗the 
state of being united to a person of the opposite sex.‘‖57  According to the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court, whether to grant jurisdiction to the family court 
to divorce same-sex couples was a question of policy to be left to the 
legislature.
58
  Thus, Ms. Chambers and Ms. Ormiston‘s divorce petition was 
dismissed, and ―[l]awyers have said Ormiston and Chambers could get 
divorced if one [of them] moved to Massachusetts and lived there for a 
year.‖59 
Understandably, both partners were unwilling to do so because, in Ms. 
Ormiston‘s words, ―[t]o move to Massachusetts when I own a home here [in 
Rhode Island] is an unfair and unreasonable burden that no other citizen has 
to bear.‖60  This case, therefore, highlights the unique difficulties that same-
sex couples often encounter when trying to dissolve their marriage.  As 
mentioned earlier, states impose these difficulties when they close the 
courthouse doors to same-sex divorcees, forcing the couples to return to the 
 
52. Edward Fitzpatrick, R.I. High Court Rules Against Divorce in Same-Sex Marriages, 
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 8, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.projo.com/news/courts/content/same_sex_divorce_12-08-
07_6D869Q6_v18.2709228.html. 
53. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958–59 (R.I. 2007). 
54. Id. 
55. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 958, 967; Fitzpatrick, supra note 52. 
56. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 961–63. 
57. Id. at 962 (quoting WEBSTER‘S THIRD INT‘L DICTIONARY 1384 (Philip Gove ed., 1961)). 
58. Id. at 966–67. 
59. Fitzpatrick, supra note 52; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
60. Fitzpatrick, supra note 52. 
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state of marriage or civil union to achieve appropriate legal dissolution of the 
relationship under the laws of that state.
61
  As the case of Ms. Chambers and 
Ms. Ormiston demonstrates, however, this often involves a significant burden 
on the couple, such as establishing domicile within the state of marriage and 
meeting any durational residency requirements.
62
  It is clear from this case 
that these difficulties are real and that they hold real consequences for same-
sex couples, such as not being able to divorce at all.  Later, this Comment will 
examine in detail the implications of a state‘s adoption of such a no-divorce 
policy for same-sex couples.
63
 
3. New York 
While the Rhode Island case serves as an example of banning same-sex 
couples outright from access to the courts for divorce, the contrasting New 
York case of Gonzalez v. Green
64
 shows a court‘s approval of a homosexual 
couple‘s dissolution based on contract law.  David Gonzalez and Steven 
Green were married in Massachusetts in February 2005.
65
  The relationship 
did not last, however, and in September 2005, Mr. Green‘s attorney drafted a 
―separation agreement‖ for the parties, which was designed to ―confirm their 
separation and make arrangements in connection therewith, including the 
settlement of their property rights, and other rights and obligations growing 
out of the marriage relation.‖66  In other words, this document was a typical 
separation agreement, similar in content to those often executed by divorcing 
heterosexual couples.
67
  Mr. Green and Mr. Gonzalez fully executed the 
agreement on September 21 and 22, 2005, and on January 20, 2006, Mr. 
Gonzalez filed an ―Action [f]or [a] Divorce‖ in the New York County 
Supreme Court.
68
 
Several months following Mr. Gonzalez‘s filing, New York‘s highest 
court, the court of appeals, ruled in Hernandez v. Robles
69
 that ―the New York 
Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between members of 
the same sex,‖ indicating that refusing to grant marriage licenses to same-sex 
 
61. See supra Part I. 
62. For a brief summary of these domicile and durational residency requirements, see 
KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32, §§ 26:19, 27:4; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, 
§§ 4–5 (West 2007). 
63. See infra Part III.A. 
64. 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
65. Id. at 857. 
66. Id. 
67. For a rough example of such an agreement, often termed a ―marital settlement agreement,‖ 
see LEONARD L. LOEB ET AL., SYSTEM BOOK FOR FAMILY LAW 8-20–8-34 (6th ed. 2007). 
68. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 857–58. 
69. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). 
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couples passed New York constitutional muster.
 70
  Following this ruling, Mr. 
Green filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Mr. 
Gonzalez‘s petition for divorce, as well as rescission of the separation 
agreement.
71
  Mr. Green put forward several grounds for rescission, including 
failure of consideration, violation of public policy, and mutual mistake, all of 
which were based on the argument that the parties never had a valid marriage 
under either Massachusetts or New York law.
72
 
The court in Gonzalez agreed that the parties never had a valid marriage, 
and therefore dismissed the plaintiff‘s ―Action for a Divorce.‖73  As to the 
separation agreement, however, the court employed basic contract principles 
in upholding its validity.  According to the court, ―‗while cohabitation without 
marriage does not give rise to the property and financial rights which 
normally attend the marital relation, neither does cohabitation disable the 
parties from making an agreement within the normal rules of contract law.‘‖74  
Thus, the court was unwilling to nullify the agreement on public policy 
grounds because it did not want to infringe upon the parties‘ freedom of 
contract.  The court similarly dismissed the defendant‘s failure of 
consideration and mutual mistake arguments and ultimately ruled that the 
agreement was ―valid and in full force and effect.‖75  This case provides an 
excellent example of a court‘s reliance on contract principles to facilitate 
same-sex divorce, and it will serve as a helpful tool when this Comment in 
Part III examines using such a method in Wisconsin. 
Gonzalez was not, however, the last word on same-sex divorce in the New 
York courts.  In the most recent development, the New York courts have 
faced a challenge to the holding in Gonzalez that the parties never had a valid 
marriage.  This challenge occurred in the case of C.M. v. C.C.,
76
 in which a 
same-sex couple who had been married in Massachusetts sought a divorce in 
the New York court system.
77
  This was the same situation as that presented 
by the parties in Gonzalez, yet the court in C.M. refused to nullify the parties‘ 
 
70. Id. at 5, 12. 
71. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 858. 
72. Id.  In Gonzalez, the court found the parties‘ marriage to be null and void in Massachusetts 
because of a statute that nullified marriages contracted in Massachusetts by same-sex couples 
planning to reside in a state where such a marriage would be void.  Id. at  858–59 (citing MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 2007)).  The court also found the marriage to be null and void under 
New York law because the state statutes governing marriage impliedly limited its availability to 
opposite-sex couples, and the court of appeals‘ decision in Robles upheld the constitutionality of this 
limitation.  Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 857–58 (citing Robles, 855 N.E.2d at 6, 12). 
73. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 859. 
74. Id. (quoting Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 1980)). 
75. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 860–61. 
76. 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
77. Id. at 885. 
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Massachusetts marriage as the court in Gonzalez had done.  Instead, the court 
in C.M. held that 
 
[t]here is nothing in the holding of Hernandez [v. Robles]
78
 to 
suggest that the Court of Appeals intended to place same sex 
marriages, validly authorized by other states or countries, into 
the narrow category of abhorrent conduct for which comity or 
full faith and credit should not apply in a divorce 
proceeding.
79
 
 
Thus, because it found that neither New York law, Massachusetts law, nor 
public policy prevented recognition of the Massachusetts marriage, the court 
in C.M. officially recognized the marriage and, therefore, held that it had 
jurisdiction over the divorce action.
80
 
The court in C.M. based this holding in part on the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division‘s decision in Martinez v. County of Monroe,81 in 
which the court held that neither the New York Court of Appeals‘ decision in 
Robles nor the public policy of the state of New York prohibited recognition 
of the plaintiff‘s same-sex marriage, which was performed in Canada.82  
Because the court recognized this marriage, it granted the plaintiff the 
protection of the New York sexual orientation discrimination laws.
83
  The 
court in C.M., after discussing the Martinez court‘s recognition of the 
Canadian marriage and noting that the court‘s decision in Gonzalez could not 
be reconciled with the Martinez decision, refused to adopt the portion of the 
 
78. 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006). 
79. C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887.  Essentially, then, the courts in Gonzalez and C.M. simply 
differed in their interpretations of Robles, with the former believing it affirmatively prohibited same-
sex marriages in New York, and the latter reasoning that it merely required the legislature to speak 
directly to the availability of same-sex marriage, refusing itself to either prohibit or require it.  Id.; 
Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856. 
80. C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at  887–89.  The court in C.M. also analyzed whether the marriage was 
invalid in Massachusetts on account of the Massachusetts Superior Court‘s decision in Cote-
Whiteacre v. Department of Public Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 WL 3208758 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 
29, 2006).  C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 889.  In Cote-Whiteacre, the court found that ―same-sex marriage 
is prohibited in New York,‖ based solely on the New York Court of Appeals‘ decision in Robles.  
Cote-Whiteacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *2.  The court in C.M. noted, however, that according to the 
Massachusetts courts, same-sex marriage became prohibited in New York only as of the date of the 
Robles decision.  C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 889.  Because the C.M. plaintiff‘s marriage predated the 
Robles decision, it was not prohibited by New York law at the time, and thus was valid under 
Massachusetts law, allowing the court to recognize its validity in New York.  Id. 
81. 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
82. Id. at 743; see also Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504–06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) 
(holding that principles of comity dictated recognizing the validity of parties‘ Canadian same-sex 
marriage). 
83. Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 743. 
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Gonzalez decision prohibiting recognition of a same-sex marriage performed 
in Massachusetts.
84
  Thus, based on the C.M. and Martinez decisions, it 
appears that New York will recognize the validity of same-sex marriages from 
at least Massachusetts and Canada and apply New York laws to the members 
of such unions. 
These decisions, combined with that of Gonzalez v. Green,
85
 provide 
excellent examples of the multiple ways states can choose to handle same-sex 
divorce.  The contractual-relationship method employed by the court in 
Gonzalez and the application of state law to same-sex unions favored by the 
courts in C.M. and Martinez show that there are viable options outside 
complete bans on court access for same-sex divorces.  With this in mind, this 
Comment now turns to an examination of same-sex marriage in Wisconsin, 
followed by a discussion of how Wisconsin courts might implement these and 
other options. 
C.  Same-Sex Marriage in Wisconsin 
Before examining how Wisconsin should handle the possibility of same-
sex divorce, it is helpful to first discuss Wisconsin‘s background and history 
relating to same-sex marriage.  By statute, the Wisconsin Legislature has 
defined marriage as ―a legal relationship between 2 equal persons, a husband 
and wife, who owe to each other mutual responsibility and support.‖86  
Therefore, under this and other Wisconsin laws, same-sex couples are clearly 
and specifically banned from obtaining legal marriage within the state of 
Wisconsin or from having a marriage obtained in another state recognized by 
the Wisconsin government.
87
 
Wisconsin took this ban one step further in 2006 when its citizens voted to 
amend the state constitution to ban recognition of out-of-state civil unions and 
same-sex marriages.
88
  The Wisconsin amendment states, ―Only a marriage 
 
84. C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887. 
85. 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
86. WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2) (2007–2008). 
87. See WIS. STAT. § 765.04(1) (2007–2008).  This section reads, in relevant part: 
 
If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is . . . 
prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state goes into 
another state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited or declared 
void under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in 
this state with the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state. 
Id.  
88. Bill Glauber, Election 2006: Marriage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2006, at 9A; see 
also WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.  The legality of this constitutional amendment was recently 
challenged in the Dane County Circuit Court, when a University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh professor 
alleged that the amendment was improperly presented to voters.  Stacy Forster, Judge Upholds 
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between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage 
in [Wisconsin],‖ and a ―legal status identical or substantially similar to that of 
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in 
[Wisconsin].‖89  Because same-sex marriage already was barred by statute, 
this amendment‘s primary effect was to ban the recognition of civil unions 
formed in other states and to thereby deny same-sex couples any rights or 
privileges they may have enjoyed as a result of such a union.
90
  Ultimately, 
the statutes and this constitutional amendment make it clear that Wisconsin‘s 
public policy is strongly against recognition of same-sex unions, which 
certainly will affect Wisconsin courts‘ willingness to dissolve such 
relationships. 
III.  SAME-SEX DIVORCE IN WISCONSIN: OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Although there have been no cases, as there were in Rhode Island and 
New York, where a local same-sex couple has turned to the Wisconsin courts 
for dissolution of either a civil union or marriage obtained in another state, the 
situation undoubtedly will arise based on the expanding recognition of such 
unions across the United States.
91
  When that situation occurs, the Wisconsin 
courts will have at least three options for handling the same-sex divorce: 1) 
bar the couple from access to the courts for such proceedings; 2) allow the 
parties into court and apply Wisconsin law to adjudicate the divorce; or 3) 
allow the parties into court and apply the law of the state where the 
relationship was founded.  The rest of this Comment will examine these 
options in detail, discussing their relative advantages, disadvantages, and 
justifications. 
 
State’s Ban on Gay Marriage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 31, 2008, at B3.  The UW-Oshkosh 
professor claimed that ―two separate subjects were presented to voters‖ and argued that the propriety 
of same-sex marriage is an issue distinct from that of ―other similar legal relationships, such as civil 
unions.‖  Id.  Under the Wisconsin Constitution, ―if more than one amendment be submitted [to the 
voters], they shall be submitted in such manner that the people may vote for or against such 
amendments separately.‖  WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1.  The court ultimately dismissed the professor‘s 
complaint, however, holding that the constitutional amendment ―fully complied with the 
requirements of Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1, in that it properly included two propositions that both 
related to the same subject matter, and were designed to accomplish the same general purpose.‖  
McConkey v. Van Hollen, No. 07-CV-2657, 2008 WL 5503993, at *1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 9, 2008). 
89. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. 
90. Glauber, supra note 88. 
91. See sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Option 1: Outright Ban 
1. Implications and Consequences 
Wisconsin‘s first, and perhaps simplest, option for dealing with same-sex 
divorce is to impose an outright ban on access to the courts for this 
proceeding.  In doing so, the courts would align themselves with the state‘s 
apparent policy against same-sex marriage, embodied by the recent 
constitutional amendment.
92
  Similar to Wisconsin‘s amendment banning 
same-sex marriage, a common-law ban on the use of Wisconsin courts for 
same-sex divorce would be consistent with the people of Wisconsin‘s 
apparently negative view toward granting homosexual couples the rights, 
benefits, and incidents of heterosexual marriage.
 93
 
The counterargument, however, is that courts should not be allowed to 
make this type of sweeping policy judgment.  More specifically, policy 
decisions such as this are better left to the legislature, as exemplified by 
Wisconsin‘s prohibitory statutes and constitutional amendment.94  However, it 
is actually because of this constitutional amendment that the ―judicial 
activism‖ argument fails.  When told that it should not make policy decisions 
better left to the legislature, a court could simply reply that it is interpreting 
the law in accordance with the stated policy of the legislature and the people 
of Wisconsin, as embodied by the statutes and the constitution. 
If Wisconsin courts did choose to close their doors to potential same-sex 
divorcees, what options would these couples have?  Most likely, the couple 
would be forced to return to the courts of the state where their relationship 
was legally validated and sever the relationship there.
95
  The couple could 
also, however, make a private agreement to divide the property gained during 
the relationship, as well as to establish each individual‘s rights and 
responsibilities following separation.
96
  This, however, would hardly 
constitute sufficient certainty as to the parties‘ rights and remedies in the 
event of a subsequent breach of the agreement, as there would be no guarantee 
 
92. See WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. 
93. See, e.g., Stacy Forster, Distant Gay Nuptials Defy Obscure Law: California Weddings 
Could Draw Prosecution in Wisconsin, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 3, 2008, at B1 (referencing  
WIS. STAT. §§ 765.04 and 765.30(1)(a) (2007–2008), which, collectively, would subject same-sex 
couples who married in another state to criminal prosecution, with a possible fine of $10,000 and up 
to nine months in prison); Bill Glauber, Marriage Measure Backer Savors Win: She Prepares for 
Future After Amendment, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 2006, at A9 (describing the intense 
lobbying efforts of one citizen‘s group in support of the Wisconsin constitutional amendment 
banning gay marriage). 
94. WIS. STAT. §§ 765.001(2), 765.04(1) (2007–2008); Glauber, supra note 93, at A9. 
95. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). 
96. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
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that they would be allowed into court to litigate such a separation dispute.
97
  If 
they were denied access, perhaps because of the courts‘ complete ban on 
anything resembling same-sex divorce, the agreement likely would be useless 
and the parties would end up seeking a divorce in court in the original state 
anyway.  Therefore, it is unlikely that any such solution would be either long-
lasting or satisfactory for the parties, particularly given the discord that 
frequently accompanies a divorce. 
The likelihood of forced travel, along with its attendant difficulties, seems 
to make an outright ban on same-sex divorce unfair to the affected 
individuals.  More specifically, is it fair to the parties involved to force them 
to travel cross-country to dissolve their legal relationship, especially 
considering the relatively low burden of adjudicating these disputes in the 
Wisconsin court system?  Given the Wisconsin divorce rate,
98
 the court 
system obviously deals frequently with marriage dissolution.  Balanced 
against the courts‘ familiarity with divorce matters, of course, is the often 
protracted and litigious nature of actions for divorce.
99
  On the other hand, the 
2000 U.S. Census indicated that at that time, only 0.7% of Wisconsin 
households were headed by same-sex partners.
100
  Though that number has 
risen since 2000,
101
 it is still not large enough to infer that state courts would 
be inundated with same-sex divorce requests. 
Such an inundation seems particularly unlikely given that the only couples 
who would actually seek legal dissolution are those who have had their 
relationship legally recognized in another state
102
 and have subsequently taken 
 
97. If the Wisconsin courts were willing to view such a separation agreement as merely a 
private contract by which the parties agreed to order their affairs, there is little doubt that the parties 
could litigate their dispute in the Wisconsin courts.  See Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 306 (1987) 
(―Courts traditionally have settled contract and property disputes between unmarried persons, some 
of whom have cohabited.‖).  If, however, the courts chose to view the agreement as an instrument of 
divorce under the ―outright ban‖ method (i.e., a complete refusal to entertain any action even 
resembling same-sex divorce), the court may prevent itself from hearing the dispute.  
98. In 2006, the number of divorces in Wisconsin equaled 50% of the number of marriages in 
the same year, or 16,730 divorces.  WIS. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., supra note 4, at 12. 
99. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 52. 
100. Tavia Simmons & Martin O‘Connell, Married-Couple and Unmarried-Partner 
Households: 2000, in CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS (U.S. Dep‘t of Commerce, Census Bureau ed., 
2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf. 
101. One study indicates that from 2000 to 2005, the number of same-sex couples in Wisconsin 
rose from 8,232 to 14,894, an increase of 81%.  GARY J. GATES, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY,  
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL POPULATION: NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, 
app. 1 (UCLA Law Sch. Williams Inst. on Sexual Orientation ed., 2006), available at 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/SameSexCouplesandGLBpopACS.pdf.  
102. Obviously, such legal recognition would have to occur outside of Wisconsin, given 
Wisconsin‘s current statutory and constitutional blocks to same-sex marriage.  See WIS. CONST. art. 
XIII, § 13; WIS. STAT. §§ 765.001(2), 765.04(1) (2007–2008) (prohibiting, collectively, both same-
sex marriage and same-sex civil unions). 
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up Wisconsin residence.  Because this number is likely small, and the number 
of such couples actually seeking legal dissolution is even smaller, an outright 
ban probably cannot be justified on the grounds of judicial economy or 
efficiency.  Indeed, a willingness to adjudicate same-sex divorces actually is 
supported by concerns for national judicial economy, as courts in states 
recognizing same-sex marriage would not be forced to deal with the 
administrative issues and inefficiencies that typically accompany adjudication 
of disputes involving out-of-state litigants.  Therefore, there does not seem to 
be any reason, outside of Wisconsin‘s apparent public policy against same-sex 
marriage, for denying same-sex couples access to the Wisconsin courts for 
legal dissolution. 
2. Counterarguments to an Outright Ban 
Despite Wisconsin‘s apparently clear policy against same-sex marriage, 
that policy, by itself, should not preclude discussion of the arguments against 
opening the Wisconsin courts to same-sex divorcees.  Arguments against an 
outright ban on same-sex divorce, which this section will explore, include the 
following: 1) because Wisconsin law apparently recognizes same-sex 
partners‘ rights against one another in contexts other than marriage, it should 
consider giving them rights to divorce; and 2) same-sex marriage and same-
sex divorce are fundamentally different procedures, and the public policy 
against same-sex marriage, therefore, should not automatically preclude same-
sex divorce. 
Although it is rarely, if ever, stated explicitly within the Wisconsin 
statutes, there are areas of Wisconsin law that appear to protect, or can be 
interpreted to protect, the rights of same-sex partners against one another.  
One such area is domestic abuse, which is governed by section 968.075 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.
103
  This statute defines ―domestic abuse‖ as the 
commission, by an adult person, of any of the statutorily defined actions 
―against his or her spouse or former spouse, against an adult with whom the 
person resides or formerly resided or against an adult with whom the person 
has a child in common.‖104  Because this definition does not explicitly apply 
only to heterosexual couples (as the statutes governing marriage do
105
), it is 
certainly reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended this section to 
protect homosexual victims of domestic violence as well. 
Although there is no case law in Wisconsin where this statute has been 
used to protect a homosexual partner, there is plenty of evidence that same-
sex domestic violence is a real threat and that this statute should, therefore, be 
 
103. WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (2007–2008). 
104. Id. § 968.075(1)(a). 
105. See, e.g., id. § 765.001(2). 
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construed to protect same-sex partners.  According to one report, domestic 
violence in same-sex relationships occurs at about the same rate as 
heterosexual relationships, or as high as between 25% and 33%.
106
  Given the 
high incidence of same-sex domestic violence, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that the Wisconsin Legislature actually intended Wisconsin domestic 
violence law to protect same-sex partners.
107
 
Admittedly, statutory protection against domestic violence is far from 
recognizing  same-sex divorce.  However, this statutory protection does show 
that Wisconsin law is not entirely devoid of recognition of rights for members 
of same-sex couples.  Just as members of heterosexual couples can be 
reassured that the law protects them against violence by their partners, 
members of homosexual couples know that the law extends to them as well.  
From this extension, it is reasonable to conclude that the Wisconsin 
Legislature is not completely averse to granting those in same-sex 
relationships access to the court system, particularly for matters involving 
their partners.  Certainly, access for domestic violence would not lead, by 
itself, to a conclusion that individuals in same-sex relationships should have 
court access for divorce purposes.  Access would provide evidence, however, 
that the courtroom doors have opened before to allow those in same-sex 
relationships to assert their rights against their partners, as well as provide a 
reasonable basis for same-sex couples to believe the doors can, and should, be 
opened further. 
Another area of law where same-sex couples appear to have an opening 
for increased rights is Wisconsin‘s common law regarding cohabitation.  
Given the marked increase in cohabitation across the United States in recent 
decades,
108
 it is not surprising that many states have recognized certain rights 
arising from a cohabiting relationship.
109
  While there certainly is a broad 
spectrum as to the amount and breadth of these rights, there is no doubt that 
states are adapting to the societal shift toward cohabitation. 
 
106. Connie Burk, Think, Re-think: Domestic Violence in Lesbian, Bisexual and Trans 
Relationships, WIS. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Summer 1999, at 2. 
107. This belief is bolstered by the legislative history of section 968.075, which states that 
Wisconsin‘s domestic violence law was created so that criminal laws would be ―enforced without 
regard to the relationship of the persons involved.‖  Act of April 21, 1988, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws  
1229, 1229. 
108. See, e.g., Eric Nagourney, Study Finds Families Bypassing Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2000, at F8. 
109. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 
1325, 1327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Connell v. Diehl, 938 A.2d 143, 145 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2008).  But see Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122, 123–24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (explaining that public 
policy precluded a holding that the plaintiff was entitled to an equitable interest in his cohabitant‘s 
property). 
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Wisconsin joined these states in 1987, with the case of Watts v. Watts.
110
  
In Watts, the plaintiff and the defendant had cohabited for twelve years, and 
the relationship produced two children.
111
  Once the relationship ended, the 
plaintiff filed suit seeking an accounting of the defendant‘s personal and 
business assets accumulated during the cohabitation and a determination of 
her share of such assets.
112
  The Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately held 
that, although the plaintiff‘s claim to the property acquired during the 
relationship could not rest on the property division statute in place at the time 
(i.e., the divorce statute), it could rest on ―contract, unjust enrichment or 
partition.‖113  The court specifically stated: 
 
Courts traditionally have settled contract and property 
disputes between unmarried persons, some of whom have 
cohabited.  Nonmarital cohabitation does not render every 
agreement between the cohabiting parties illegal and does not 
automatically preclude one of the parties from seeking 
judicial relief, such as statutory or common law partition, 
damages for breach of express or implied contract, 
constructive trust and quantum meruit where the party 
alleges, and later proves, facts supporting the legal theory.
114
 
 
Based on the Watts case, then, it is clear that Wisconsin law recognizes 
rights of cohabiting partners, and that these rights are grounded in contract 
theory. 
As with the domestic violence statute discussed above,
115
 there is no case 
law regarding the Watts case‘s applicability to same-sex couples.  Based on 
the court‘s statements quoted above, however, the dissolution of a cohabiting 
relationship has been characterized by Wisconsin courts as a contract or 
property dispute.  Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to 
explicitly limit the rights of cohabiting parties, following dissolution of the 
relationship, to heterosexual couples.  By failing to do so, the court apparently 
left the door open for cohabiting, homosexual couples to seek resolution of 
their separation disputes in the court system, guided by established principles 
of contract law.
116
 
 
110. 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987). 
111. Id. at 510, 405 N.W.2d at 305. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 538, 405 N.W.2d at 316. 
114. Id. at 511–12, 405 N.W.2d at 306. 
115. WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (2007–2008). 
116. Given the age of the Watts case (decided more than twenty years ago), it is certainly 
possible, and perhaps even likely, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not consider its decision‘s 
ramifications for same-sex couples.  However, as the decision does not bar same-sex couples from 
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Obviously, contract disputes occur between all types of people, male and 
female, gay and straight.  It is unlikely (and probably a violation of the federal 
Equal Protection Clause) that a court could, or would, refuse to handle a 
property dispute because of the parties‘ gender or sexual orientation.117  
Therefore, because two homosexual people would have access to the court to 
resolve any basic, or ―normal,‖ contractual or property disputes, it does not 
seem unreasonable to extend this access to implied or express contracts based 
on the parties‘ cohabitation.118  And, one could argue, if homosexual couples 
who are merely cohabiting are granted access to the courts for the 
enforcement of rights, then homosexual couples who have achieved a valid 
marriage or civil union in another state should certainly have court access for 
the dissolution of the contractual relationship created by such out-of-state 
unions.
119
 
The second major argument against an outright ban on same-sex divorce 
is that the public policy behind banning same-sex marriage is not directly 
applicable to same-sex divorce.  More specifically, the fact that same-sex 
divorce is a process different and separate from same-sex marriage means that 
recognition of such divorce presents no significant public policy issues.  To 
understand this argument, it is necessary to first examine the distinction it 
makes between same-sex marriage and same-sex divorce. 
This distinction is that same-sex divorce is the legal termination of an 
essentially contractual relationship, while marriage is the creation of such a 
relationship.  The primary policy problem always has revolved around the 
creation, and not the dissolution, of marriage.  In fact, many critics would 
likely seek to dissolve as many of these relationships as possible.  Supporters 
of same-sex divorce would, therefore, argue that a court‘s recognition of this 
 
seeking contractual remedies following the dissolution of a cohabiting relationship, there is no reason 
to doubt that such couples could use the court system to obtain these remedies. 
117. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635–36 
(1996) (striking down, on equal protection grounds, a Colorado constitutional amendment that 
―prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government 
designed to protect . . . homosexual persons‖). 
118. The biggest possible problem with this extension is whether the implied contract that 
grants rights to the cohabiting parties is based on living in a marriage-like relationship.  If there is 
such a requirement, it is highly unlikely that the Wisconsin courts would recognize such an implied 
contract, as it would be contrary to public policy and the Wisconsin Constitution.  See WIS. CONST. 
art. XIII, § 13 (forbidding recognition of ―[a] legal status identical or substantially similar to that of 
marriage for unmarried individuals‖ of the same sex).  However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
imposed no such requirement in Watts, meaning there is apparently no black-letter law in Wisconsin 
to that effect.  An interesting topic, therefore, would be the effect of this constitutional amendment on 
Wisconsin law regarding cohabitation, specifically the Watts case.  Such a topic, however, is beyond 
the scope of this Comment. 
119. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); Gonzalez v. Green, 831 
N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
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procedure would have no bearing on a state‘s policy regarding the creation of 
same-sex marriages.  The two processes—one a creation, the other a 
dissolution—are fundamentally different (although they are of course linked), 
and because of this difference, the argument goes, it is entirely possible for a 
court to recognize same-sex divorce without recognizing same-sex marriage. 
The problem with this argument, however, is two-fold.  First, many 
people may consider recognition of same-sex divorce a de facto recognition of 
same-sex marriage and condemn it as a mere end-around to avoid the 
constitutional and statutory bans.
120
  These people may be concerned that 
granting same-sex couples the right to seek a divorce would undercut the 
effectiveness of these bans by expanding the rights of, and therefore the legal 
recognition of, same-sex couples.  Second, as a doctrinal matter, it is difficult 
to discern how a court could logically dissolve a relationship it does not 
recognize in the first place.  For same-sex couples to avoid the first problem, 
it would likely be necessary to categorize their relationship as something other 
than a marriage, such as a civil union.  However, while this may solve the first 
problem, it does not solve the logical inconsistency created by the Wisconsin 
Constitutional amendment discussed earlier.
121
  Because this amendment 
basically denies recognition of civil unions, the courts still would be asked to 
dissolve a relationship they cannot legally recognize.
122
  Because of this 
logical and ultimately legal obstacle, supporters of same-sex divorce likely 
would have a difficult time finding a sufficient lack of connection between 
same-sex marriage and divorce to placate those opposed to legal recognition 
of either or both legal processes. 
Ultimately, there are several arguments on both sides regarding an 
outright ban on same-sex divorce in the Wisconsin courts.  Imposing such a 
ban would have obvious consequences for same-sex couples whose 
relationship is legally recognized in another state, and would further cement 
Wisconsin‘s position as decidedly anti-same-sex marriage.  Of the three 
possible options for dealing with same-sex divorce, an outright ban is the 
most extreme, at least in terms of the denial of rights to same-sex couples.  
That said, however, as the recent constitutional amendment shows, Wisconsin 
 
120. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Gay Marriage Gains Notice in State Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 2008, at B1 (discussing the various forms of recognition of same-sex marriage in New York 
state, including through granting such couples a divorce, and noting the negative reaction to such 
recognition by opponents of same-sex marriage). 
121. See WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13, discussed supra, Part II.C. 
122. Indeed, this logical, legal obstacle could mean that Wisconsin‘s current policy (if it can be 
said to have one, as the need to define such a policy has not yet arisen) is in fact an outright ban.  
Because of the statutory and constitutional prohibitions, courts probably could not simply process 
same-sex divorce petitions as they would opposite-sex petitions, as this would force them to 
recognize the couple‘s legal relationship, in violation of law.  Courts could avoid this problem, 
however, by adopting either of Options 2 or 3, discussed infra Part III.B–C. 
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is not averse to taking aggressive positions when it comes to same-sex 
marriage. 
B. Option 2: Apply Wisconsin Law 
The second possibility for solving the potential same-sex divorce problem 
is to apply Wisconsin law to such actions.  In doing so, Wisconsin courts 
could choose to apply Wisconsin divorce law, or in the alternative, Wisconsin 
contract law.  Each of these options presents various difficulties and 
advantages that will be discussed in detail below. 
1. Divorce Law 
One possibility for utilizing Wisconsin law in adjudicating same-sex 
divorce petitions would be to apply the divorce statutes equally to 
heterosexual and homosexual couples.  The two groups would have 
substantially the same rights under the law and would have equal access to the 
Wisconsin courts for the dissolution of their contractual relationships.  For 
several reasons, however, this option is highly unlikely, and most likely 
contrary to the Wisconsin Constitution.
123
 
A Wisconsin court‘s attempt to apply Wisconsin divorce statutes likely 
would violate both the Wisconsin Statutes and the Wisconsin Constitution.  In 
particular, section 767.35 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that ―[a] court 
shall grant a judgment of divorce . . . if . . . the court finds that the marriage is 
irretrievably broken . . . .‖124  This provision, combined with section 
765.001(2), which defines marriage as ―a legal relationship between 2 equal 
persons, a husband and wife,‖ shows that Wisconsin law currently extends 
divorce privileges only to married couples, and therefore only to heterosexual 
couples.
125
  Additionally, under the constitutional amendment discussed 
above,
126
 it is unlawful for any court to recognize a same-sex marriage, or 
even a same-sex marriage-like relationship.  Based on Wisconsin public 
policy and existing laws banning same-sex marriage, the Wisconsin courts 
and legislature would likely include even a de facto recognition of same-sex 
marriage in this constitutional ban, which would be accomplished as a result 
of performing a judicial dissolution of a same-sex marriage using Wisconsin 
law. 
 
123. See WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13; supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
124. WIS. STAT. § 767.35(1)(b) (2007–2008) (emphasis added). 
125. Id. § 765.001(2). 
126. WIS. CONST. art XIII, § 13, discussed supra Part II.C. 
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2. Contract Law
127
 
A second option Wisconsin courts would have in applying Wisconsin law 
to same-sex divorce would be to apply basic principles of contract law to the 
relationship.  More specifically, the courts could view same-sex marriages and 
civil unions as relationships of cohabitation and look to the doctrines of 
implied contract, unjust enrichment, or promissory estoppel in determining 
the parties‘ rights following the dissolution of the legal relationship entered 
into in a different state.  Just as the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to apply 
these principles to the dissolution of heterosexual cohabitation relationships in 
Watts v. Watts,
128
 Wisconsin courts could simply expand this application to 
same-sex divorce. 
The primary benefit of treating same-sex divorces as contract disputes is 
that it offers a forum to same-sex couples while avoiding the statutory 
violations that would likely attend resolving the dispute under Wisconsin 
divorce laws.
129
  Rather than recognizing a same-sex marriage, the courts 
merely would be acknowledging the existence of a contractual relationship 
between the parties and using established contract principles to resolve the 
parties‘ dispute.130  Granted, this may appear to critics as nothing more than a 
thinly veiled attempt to achieve recognition of same-sex divorce, and 
therefore same-sex marriage.  The defining difference, however, is the 
substantive law that would be applied.  Theoretically, the same-sex couple‘s 
court action would never have to mention the word ―divorce,‖ but instead 
would rely upon the modification or cancellation of a contract.
131
 
An additional benefit of using contract law to deal with same-sex divorces 
would be the added incentive for same-sex couples to draft and execute their 
own ―separation agreements,‖ as in the New York case of Gonzalez v. 
Green.
132
  Armed with the confidence that the courts would consistently apply 
basic contract principles to any such agreement, the parties would be willing 
to invest significant time in drafting a fair and equitable agreement to end the 
contractual relationship.  This would decrease litigation of such cases and 
provide for greater certainty in the law. 
 
127. For an interesting discussion of same-sex marriage as a contractual relationship, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 5.8 (7th ed. 2007). 
128. 137 Wis. 2d 506, 538, 405 N.W.2d 303, 316 (1987), discussed supra Part III.A.1. 
129. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
130. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
131. As with the solution of applying out-of-state law to Wisconsin divorce actions, applying 
Wisconsin contract law to same-sex divorces is not without logistical and administrative difficulties.  
Problems such as which contract doctrines to apply, or how the doctrines should be modified to 
accommodate the unique issues in divorce cases, are only some of the possible obstacles.  Again, 
however, an in-depth analysis of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
132. 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), discussed supra Part II.B.3. 
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That is not to say, however, that this method would be free of difficulties.  
First, the protections afforded by divorce law certainly are not identical to 
those typically recognized under contract principles.  For example, under 
Wisconsin divorce law, the party receiving support or maintenance typically 
can return to court to seek a revision of the amount or schedule of such 
payments.
133
  There is no similar provision under contract law where a party 
can revisit a prior cancellation agreement and seek a court order modifying 
the terms of that cancellation.  This deficiency, among other discrepancies 
between divorce and contract law, may limit the rights that are available to 
same-sex couples who seek to dissolve their relationship.  These limitations 
must be balanced, however, against the costs that would be incurred in 
dissolving that relationship in its state of origin.  In this situation, limited 
rights may seem better than no rights at all.
134
 
A second difficulty regarding the application of contract principles to 
same-sex divorce is the determination of which contract principles would 
apply to these types of actions.  Specifically, would courts adopt all contract 
doctrines, such as mutual mistake, promissory estoppel, and modification, or 
would they pick and choose from among the doctrines on a case-by-case 
basis, applying some and refusing to apply others?  If Wisconsin courts 
adopted an inclusive policy, making any and all doctrines applicable, 
obviously this would not be a problem.  However, given the breadth of 
contract law and the general aversion to granting rights to same-sex couples, 
the adoption of such an inclusive approach seems unlikely.  It is more likely 
that the courts would attempt to limit the available doctrines as much as 
possible.  To that end, the courts would have to determine just how far they 
are willing to extend same-sex couples‘ access to legal dissolution of their 
contractual relationship. 
As an example, consider two same-sex partners who negotiated and 
executed a separation agreement that was upheld by the court but 
subsequently was breached by one of the parties.  Would the court allow the 
nonbreaching party to come into court seeking damages, modification of the 
agreement, or any other legal or equitable remedies?  Or would the court 
simply limit its own power to validation of such agreements, leaving it to the 
parties to work out any subsequent problems?  This is admittedly a somewhat 
extreme example, in that the latter option would be a severely limited view of 
 
133. WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1c)(1) (2007–2008). 
134. Indeed, the couple from Rhode Island discussed in Part II.B.2 serves as an example of 
why same-sex couples seeking a divorce may be willing to accept something less than a full divorce 
proceeding.  Rather than undergo the hardships associated with moving back to Massachusetts for a 
year, the couple instead expressed a willingness to simply remain married.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 
52.  In such a situation, it seems likely that a same-sex couple would gladly accept a legal dissolution 
of their ―contract‖ (i.e., their relationship), regardless of whether it was actually labeled a ―divorce.‖  
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the court‘s power, but it demonstrates the point that courts would have 
difficult decisions to make regarding the extent to which they are willing to 
involve themselves in the dissolution of same-sex marriages or civil unions. 
A third difficulty that courts would encounter in applying contract 
principles to same-sex divorces would be the resolution of the ancillary issues 
of divorce, such as marital/community property division
135
 and spousal 
support.
136
  These issues are rarely, if ever, dealt with in any other context 
besides divorce, meaning the court likely would not rely solely on contract 
principles in resolving them.  Thus, courts would be forced to consult other 
areas of law, particularly divorce law, in resolving these matters if the parties 
could not agree.  Normally this would not be a problem, but given the 
sensitive nature of the same-sex marriage and divorce questions, if courts 
began applying divorce law to supposed contractual disputes, it could raise the 
previously discussed concerns stemming from Wisconsin‘s statutory and 
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage.
137
 
 
135. Marital/community property has been defined as ―[p]roperty owned in common by 
husband and wife as a result of its having been acquired during the marriage by means other than an 
inheritance or a gift to one spouse, each spouse holding a one-half interest in the property.‖  BLACK‘S 
LAW DICTIONARY 274 (7th ed. 1999).  Wisconsin is one of several states to have adopted the 
community property system, doing so in 1984 through the passage of the Wisconsin Marital Property 
Act.  See KEITH A. CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN § 1.2 (3d ed. 
2004).  Although a full discussion of the rights of same-sex spouses under this community property 
system is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that the community property 
system could pose significant difficulties for Wisconsin courts attempting to apply Wisconsin 
divorce or contract law to same-sex couples.  Although the courts likely would hold that because 
same-sex couples are not married under Wisconsin law, see WIS. CONST. art XIII, § 13 (banning 
same-sex marriage), they have no rights under the community property laws, the issue almost 
certainly would be litigated, see WIS. STAT. §§ 766.03(1), 766.01(5) (stating that the marital property 
chapter applies to spouses ―upon their determination date,‖ and defining the ―determination date‖ as 
the date of the spouses‘ marriage).  For further discussion of the impact of community property laws 
on same-sex couples in other states, see Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of Community-Source 
Property Acquired in Another State (and Its Impact on a Montana Marriage Dissolution, Estate 
Planning, Property Transfers, and Probate), 69 MONT. L. REV. 313, 357–65 (2008). 
136. These examples are only two of the myriad issues that arise in connection with normal 
divorce actions, with another being the rights of the parents to custody of the children.  This issue can 
be particularly troublesome for same-sex parents, as there is no guarantee they will have any 
biological or adoptive relation to the children.  If a couple has a civil union or other legal 
relationship, this may not be an issue if the couple seeks to divorce in the state where they formed 
that relationship, as the laws may be sufficiently developed to cover this situation.  However, when 
the couple moves to a state that does not recognize their union, the nonbiological, nonadoptive parent 
could be in serious danger of losing all parental rights.  This is yet another example of the difficulties 
surrounding same-sex divorce in non-same-sex union states, demonstrating again the care that courts 
and legislatures must have in deciding how to handle same-sex divorce requests.  For an analysis of 
how the nonbiological, nonadoptive parent‘s situation may proceed, see generally Deborah L. 
Forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of Gay Marriage, Civil Unions, and 
Domestic Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
137. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
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Ultimately, although the application of contract law to petitions for same-
sex divorce is an imperfect solution to the problem discussed in this 
Comment, it undoubtedly represents a compromise position that offers 
benefits to both sides of the argument.  By offering same-sex couples access 
to the Wisconsin courts for these proceedings, without formally recognizing 
same-sex divorce (and therefore marriage), this solution would seem to 
appease, if not reconcile, the groups on either side of the issue. 
C. Option 3: Apply the Law from the State of Legal Union 
The final, and perhaps most compromising, solution to the same-sex 
divorce problem is to allow same-sex couples access to the Wisconsin courts 
for divorce purposes, but use the laws of the state where the couple was 
legally joined to adjudicate the divorce petition.  Whether it was a marriage in 
Massachusetts or a civil union in Vermont, the Wisconsin court could simply 
inform the parties that the law of their contracting state would govern the 
divorce proceeding, and the parties could prepare their cases accordingly. 
Applying out-of-state law is not an uncommon occurrence in Wisconsin 
courts.  Courts routinely apply out-of-state law in several different contexts, 
such as rights of spouses,
138
 contract rights,
139
 and torts.
140
  Thus, in 
adjudicating same-sex divorces, Wisconsin courts could simply apply the 
divorce laws of the contracting state and thereby effectively resolve any 
disputes between the partners regarding the dissolution of the relationship, as 
well as issue a legally binding order of such dissolution.  Because the parties‘ 
contracting state obviously would have more experience with same-sex 
unions (Wisconsin, of course, has none), hopefully these states would also 
have at least partially developed divorce codes.
141
  This would make it easier 
for Wisconsin courts to preside over judicial dissolutions using out-of-state 
law, alleviating any potential concerns over increased judicial workloads. 
 
138. See Xiong v. Xiong, 2002 WI App. 110, ¶14, 255 Wis. 2d 693, ¶14, 648 N.W.2d 900, ¶ 14 
(stating that the ―‗law of the matrimonial domicil [sic] governs with respect to the substantial rights 
of husband and wife, as between themselves and their privies‘‖) (quoting Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis. 
14, 17, 53 N.W.2d 740, 742 (1952)). 
139. See generally Belland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 391, 393–95, 410 N.W.2d 611, 
612–13 (Ct. App. 1987) (deciding whether Illinois, Wisconsin, or Ohio law was applicable to a 
family exclusion clause in an insurance contract, following a car accident occurring in Wisconsin). 
140. See generally Burns v. Geres, 140 Wis. 2d. 197, 199–201, 409 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Ct. App. 
1987) (holding that Arizona‘s, rather than Wisconsin‘s, safe-place statute applied to plaintiff‘s 
negligence action). 
141. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 4 (West 2007) (detailing divorce procedures 
for both heterosexual and homosexual married couples); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1206 (2002) (―The 
dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedure and be subject to the same substantive 
rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution of marriage . . . .‖). 
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This option has several other advantages, with perhaps the most important 
being its compromising nature.  As mentioned earlier, the ―ban-it-outright‖ 
position on same-sex divorce carries with it several hardships for same-sex 
couples who have been joined in other states and now reside in Wisconsin.
142
  
That position, however, is also most in line with Wisconsin‘s public policy 
against same-sex marriage.  To apply the law of the contracting state, on the 
other hand, would serve the interests of both Wisconsin public policy and 
same-sex couples seeking divorce in Wisconsin. 
More specifically, applying out-of-state law would save same-sex couples 
from the difficulties associated with returning to the contracting state, such as 
complying with domicile and durational residency requirements that typically 
pervade divorce statutes.
143
  Further, it would allow these couples to achieve 
the dissolution of their relationship that they would be entitled to had they 
remained in the contracting state.
144
  From a public policy perspective, this 
solution does not undermine Wisconsin‘s clearly stated policy judgment that 
same-sex marriage is not recognized under Wisconsin law.  In applying out-
of-state law, the courts would essentially serve as conduits of the out-of-state 
courts and, at least conceptually, would not be sanctioning same-sex marriage, 
either directly or indirectly.  The concerns about the statutory and 
constitutional prohibitions of same-sex marriage would be alleviated, and 
Wisconsin could serve its same-sex citizens by offering same-sex couples a 
forum for divorce without actually recognizing it under the law, and at the 
same time protect its public policy against same-sex marriage. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
None of the solutions presented in this Comment are intended, nor are 
they able, to placate all those interested in the question of same-sex divorce in 
Wisconsin.  They are intended, however, to stimulate discussion on the topic 
 
142. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). 
143. Of course, this option is not without its own logistical difficulties.  For example, applying 
Massachusetts law to a same-sex couple‘s divorce petition in Wisconsin theoretically would still 
require that the couple satisfy the Massachusetts domicile and durational residency requirements.  
For a brief summary of these domicile and durational residency requirements, see KINDREGAN & 
INKER, supra note 32, §§ 26:19, 27:4.  A concession that would have to be made, likely on both 
Massachusetts‘s and Wisconsin‘s part, would be to allow the couple to meet these requirements 
through domicile in Wisconsin.  As the example illustrates, this solution is clearly imperfect, but 
perfection cannot be expected.  Implementing any of the solutions presented in this Comment 
obviously would pose certain administrative and logistical difficulties, but it is beyond the scope of 
this work to examine these in detail. 
144. An interesting side note on this point is that such a solution would be more in line with the 
parties‘ expectations regarding the out-of-state contract, as they likely would expect to be able to 
dissolve the relationship in the court system.  This fact seems to provide further evidence that using 
out-of-state law to adjudicate what essentially amount to contract disputes would be an efficient 
judicial outcome. 
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and to provide a framework for analyzing the issue if and when it arises in the 
future.  There almost certainly will always be staunch supporters and perhaps 
even stauncher opponents of increased recognition of rights for same-sex 
couples, making the ability to compromise between these positions 
paramount. 
Regardless of one‘s individual opinion about the matters discussed in this 
Comment, there is no doubt that the issue of same-sex divorce is on the rise in 
America, and states across the country soon will be forced to establish laws 
and policies for handling it.
145
  When that time comes, these states, including 
Wisconsin, will be forced to choose between at least three options: 1) ban 
same-sex couples from the courthouse, forcing them to return to their state of 
union; 2) apply their own state law to the proceedings, and attempt to navigate 
the various constitutional and statutory bans on same-sex marriage; or 3) 
compromise and apply the law of the state where the parties‘ legal union was 
formed, allowing the parties a judicial remedy and protecting the states‘ 
public policies against same-sex marriage, where they exist.  When the time to 
choose does come for Wisconsin, its citizens again will be faced with the 
question of extending equal rights to same-sex couples. Hopefully, this time 
they will take a more compromising position. 
LOUIS THORSON

 
 
145. Indeed, shortly before this Comment went to print, a same-sex couple who had been 
married in Canada received a legal divorce from a superior court judge in New Jersey.  Press 
Release, ACLU of N.J., ACLU-N.J. Win Case Allowing Same-Sex Couples to Divorce in N.J. (Feb. 
6, 2009), available at http://www.aclu-nj.org/news/aclunjwinscaseallowingsame.htm.  Additionally, 
a same-sex couple filed for divorce in a Dallas state district court, which is believed to be the first 
such action in Texas.  Roy Appleton, Dallas Same-Sex Divorce Case a First for Texas, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23, 2009, at 1A, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/012309dnmetgaydivorce.42279
53.html.  Although these cases occurred too close to printing to allow an in-depth examination, they 
serve as further evidence that the issue of same-sex divorce is spreading quickly to courts across the 
nation and may make its way into the Wisconsin courts in the near future.  

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